Samuel Clarke against the determinism of Anthony Collins
In this paper I intend to present some aspects of the opposition between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins concerning freewill. After considering some reasons on which Collins determinism is founded, I shall analyze how Clarke’s concept of agency grounds his criticisms of the materialism of modern p...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Recursos: | Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM) |
| Repositorio: | Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:periodicos.uem.br/ojs:article/39425 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/39425 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Clarke Collins determinism freewill agency causality. determinismo liberdade da vontade causalidade. |
| Resumo: | In this paper I intend to present some aspects of the opposition between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins concerning freewill. After considering some reasons on which Collins determinism is founded, I shall analyze how Clarke’s concept of agency grounds his criticisms of the materialism of modern philosophy, mainly that of determinists such as Collins. |
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