Agência epistêmica, naturalismo e normatividade
The objective of this work is to present a model of epistemic agency thatseeks to attend the normative project of epistemology, while satisfying thenaturalistic intuitions about human cognitive functioning. Epistemic agencyis one of the central topics of discussion in contemporary epistemology,being...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) |
| Repositorio: | Perspectiva Filosófica (Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.periodicos.ufpe.br:article/248086 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpe.br/revistas/perspectivafilosofica/article/view/248086 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Epistemic agency naturalism metacognition Joëlle Proust. Ernest Sosa. Agência epistêmica naturalismo metacognição Joëlle Proust Ernest Sosa |
| Sumario: | The objective of this work is to present a model of epistemic agency thatseeks to attend the normative project of epistemology, while satisfying thenaturalistic intuitions about human cognitive functioning. Epistemic agencyis one of the central topics of discussion in contemporary epistemology,being an essential element for the foundation of Ernest Sosa's Epistemologyof Virtues, which understands human cognitive performances as intellectualvirtues. The development, in recent decades, of research in the field of Cog-nitive Psychology, has supported the arguments of naturalist philosopherswho challenge the image of the epistemic agent as defended by Sosa and po-int to the impossibility of having an agency related to the processes of beliefformation. Taking this context into account and based on Joëlle Proust'sconceptions about the structure of mental actions, I present a hypotheticalcase that tries to establish the bases for a concept of Hybrid Epistemic Agency. Adherence to this perspective on epistemic agency leads to a morerealistic view of the epistemic role of human agents and to an understandingof epistemic normativity aimed at epistemic-motivational purposes. |
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