THE PROCEDURAL LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND THE INFLUENCES OF RONALD DWORKIN AND KLAUS GÜNTHER
This research aims to discuss the construction of Jürgen Habermas' theory of judicial interpretation, considering the way that this philosopher employ the ideas of Ronald Dworkin and Klaus Günther. It uses the inductive method based on the works of the mentioned theorists. It identifies that Ha...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (UPM) |
| Repositorio: | Revista Direito Mackenzie |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.editorarevistas.mackenzie.br:article/16157 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://editorarevistas.mackenzie.br/index.php/rmd/article/view/16157 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Facticidade e Validade Teoria da Interpretação Procedimental Jürgen Habermas Ronald Dworkin Klaus Günther Theory of procedural interpretation; facts and norms; Jürgen Habermas; Ronald Dworkin; Klaus Günther. |
| Sumario: | This research aims to discuss the construction of Jürgen Habermas' theory of judicial interpretation, considering the way that this philosopher employ the ideas of Ronald Dworkin and Klaus Günther. It uses the inductive method based on the works of the mentioned theorists. It identifies that Habermas considers traditional methods of interpretation to be insufficient and that it is necessary to resolve the internal issue between facticity and validity that takes place in legal discourse. It visualizes that Habermas uses Ronald Dworkin's theory to resolve the first stage of the aforementioned tension, based on the use of principles and law as integrity. It understands that Habermas uses Klaus Günther's theory to divide the validity speeches from the adequacy speeches, allowing to separate the legal speeches from the moral speeches. It understands that Habermas builds a theory that has a procedural basis and starts from the application of the principle of discourse based on procedural law. In the end, it concludes that Habermas brings a generalist theoretical proposal, based on Ronald Dworkin's procedural rereading and that leaves a gap to be filled as to the dynamics of legal discourses. |
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