Intentionality in Tomasello, Searle, Dennett and Behavioral Approaches to Human Cognition
The approach of Tomasello to the evolution of human cognition attempts to integrate biological, behavioral, and cultural processes within a sole explicative system. A fundamental critic towards it has been the need of a better elaboration of the concept of intentionality. The present paper aimed to:...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
| Repositorio: | Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/17529 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17529 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Psicologia - Psicologia Experimental Intencionalidade Cognição humana Tomasello Filosofia da mente Psicologia comportamental Intentionality Human cognition Philosophy of mind Behavior psychology |
| Sumario: | The approach of Tomasello to the evolution of human cognition attempts to integrate biological, behavioral, and cultural processes within a sole explicative system. A fundamental critic towards it has been the need of a better elaboration of the concept of intentionality. The present paper aimed to: (1) analyze Tomasello’s use of the concept of intentionality, and (2) establish dialogues between this use and theories of intentionality in the philosophy of mind and functionalist approaches to human cognition in behavior psychology. The results of this paper indicate that Tomasello’s use of the concept of intentionality is compatible to these theories and approaches. Morevover, Tomasello’s approach may extend the investigation of more complex symbolic processes than the ones traditionally investigated by behavior psychology. |
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