Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Niella, Tamara, Stier, Nicolas, Sigman, Mariano
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:Argentina
Institución:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
Repositorio:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/42387
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/11336/42387
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:NUDGING COOPERATION
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
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spelling Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd ExperimentNiella, TamaraStier, NicolasSigman, MarianoNUDGING COOPERATIONhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.Fil: Niella, Tamara. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; ArgentinaFil: Stier, Nicolas. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaPublic Library of Science2016-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/zipapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/42387Niella, Tamara; Stier, Nicolas; Sigman, Mariano; Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment; Public Library of Science; Plos One; 11; 1; 1-2016; 1-20; e01471251932-6203CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0147125info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0147125info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2024-05-08T13:38:02Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/42387instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982024-05-08 13:38:02.55CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
title Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
spellingShingle Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
Niella, Tamara
NUDGING COOPERATION
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
title_short Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
title_full Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
title_fullStr Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
title_full_unstemmed Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
title_sort Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Niella, Tamara
Stier, Nicolas
Sigman, Mariano
author Niella, Tamara
author_facet Niella, Tamara
Stier, Nicolas
Sigman, Mariano
author_role author
author2 Stier, Nicolas
Sigman, Mariano
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv NUDGING COOPERATION
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
topic NUDGING COOPERATION
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
description We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/42387
Niella, Tamara; Stier, Nicolas; Sigman, Mariano; Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment; Public Library of Science; Plos One; 11; 1; 1-2016; 1-20; e0147125
1932-6203
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/42387
identifier_str_mv Niella, Tamara; Stier, Nicolas; Sigman, Mariano; Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment; Public Library of Science; Plos One; 11; 1; 1-2016; 1-20; e0147125
1932-6203
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0147125
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0147125
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/zip
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Public Library of Science
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Public Library of Science
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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