Notes on w-inconsistent Theories of Truth in Second-Order Languages
It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but ω-consistency is less frequently required. This paper argues that ω-consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | Argentina |
| Recursos: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repositorio: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/3658 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/3658 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Truth Second Order Arithmetic Omega Inconsistency https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
| Resumo: | It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but ω-consistency is less frequently required. This paper argues that ω-consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting ω-inconsistent truth theories for arithmetic is unsatisfiability. In order to bring out this point, well known ω-inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T# and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories. |
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