The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Jaume, Daniel Alejandro, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro José
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2012
País:Argentina
Institución:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
Repositorio:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/166677
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/11336/166677
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:MATCHING
ASSIGNMENT GAME
INDIVISIBLE GOODS
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
LATTICE
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
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repository_id_str
spelling The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibriaJaume, Daniel AlejandroMassó, JordiNeme, Alejandro JoséMATCHINGASSIGNMENT GAMEINDIVISIBLE GOODSCOMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUMLATTICEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents’ utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.Fil: Jaume, Daniel Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Massó, Jordi. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; EspañaFil: Neme, Alejandro José. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaSpringer Heidelberg2012-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/166677Jaume, Daniel Alejandro; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria; Springer Heidelberg; Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research (heidelberg); 76; 2; 6-2012; 161-1871432-2994CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2024-05-08T14:00:13Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/166677instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982024-05-08 14:00:13.268CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
title The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
spellingShingle The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
Jaume, Daniel Alejandro
MATCHING
ASSIGNMENT GAME
INDIVISIBLE GOODS
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
LATTICE
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
title_short The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
title_full The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
title_fullStr The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
title_full_unstemmed The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
title_sort The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Jaume, Daniel Alejandro
Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author Jaume, Daniel Alejandro
author_facet Jaume, Daniel Alejandro
Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author_role author
author2 Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro José
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv MATCHING
ASSIGNMENT GAME
INDIVISIBLE GOODS
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
LATTICE
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
topic MATCHING
ASSIGNMENT GAME
INDIVISIBLE GOODS
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
LATTICE
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
description A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents’ utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/166677
Jaume, Daniel Alejandro; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria; Springer Heidelberg; Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research (heidelberg); 76; 2; 6-2012; 161-187
1432-2994
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/166677
identifier_str_mv Jaume, Daniel Alejandro; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro José; The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria; Springer Heidelberg; Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research (heidelberg); 76; 2; 6-2012; 161-187
1432-2994
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Heidelberg
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Heidelberg
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 15.81155

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