Crucial evidence: Hobbes on contractual obligation
In this paper, I will introduce the notions of crucial argument and crucial evidence in the philosophy of intellectual history (broadly construed, including the history of political thought). I will use these concepts and take sides in an important controversy in Hobbes studies, namely whether Hobbe...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | Argentina |
| Institución: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repositorio: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/22793 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/22793 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Underdetermination of Interpretation Crucial Evidence Hobbes Contractual Obligation https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
| Sumario: | In this paper, I will introduce the notions of crucial argument and crucial evidence in the philosophy of intellectual history (broadly construed, including the history of political thought). I will use these concepts and take sides in an important controversy in Hobbes studies, namely whether Hobbes holds a prudential or a deontological theory of contractual obligation. Though there is textual evidence for both readings, I will argue that there is especially relevant evidence – crucial evidence – for interpreting Hobbes’s account in a deontological fashion. |
|---|