Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems
We consider the existence problem of stable matchings in many-to-one matching problems. Unlike other approaches which use algorithmic techniques to give necessary and sufficient conditions, we adopt a game theoretic point of view. We first associate, with each many-to-one matching problem, a hedonic...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2012 |
| Country: | Argentina |
| Institution: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repository: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/184761 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/184761 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | HEDONIC GAMES MATCHING PROBLEMS STABLE SOLUTIONS https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1 |
| Summary: | We consider the existence problem of stable matchings in many-to-one matching problems. Unlike other approaches which use algorithmic techniques to give necessary and sufficient conditions, we adopt a game theoretic point of view. We first associate, with each many-to-one matching problem, a hedonic game to take advantage of recent results guaranteeing the existence of core-partitions for that class of games, to build up our conditions. The main result states that a many-to-one matching problem, with no restrictions on individual preferences, has stable* matchings if and only if a related hedonic game is pivotally balanced. In the case that the preferences in the matching problem are substitutable, the notions of stability and stability* coincide. © 2011 Springer-Verlag. |
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