Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action
Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2007 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repository: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/10746 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/10746 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Intencionalitat (Filosofia) Intentionality (Philosophy) Coneixement d'un mateix, Teoria del Self-knowledge, Theory of Raonament Reasoning |
| Summary: | Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge |
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